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NOTES
FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS
ON PROBATION AND PAROLE SUPERVISION
The assertion of fourth amendment rights by a probationer' or
parolee2 suspected of renewed criminal activity creates a potential
confrontation between a fundamental constitutional guarantee3 and
society's legitimate interest in correctional programs which rehabili-
tate released offenders and prevent them from lapsing back into crime.4
Because courts refuse to apply the exclusionary rule5 to probation and
1. Probation is a judicial act whereby a convicted criminal offender is released into
the community under the supervision of a probation officer, in lieu of incarceration.
Administratively, this release may be accomplished either by suspending the prison sen-
tence or by withholding the imposition of a sentence altogether. See P RsmEN-'s COM-
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
CORR IONS 27-34 (1967). Probation has been described as a "reforming discipline"
through which offenders who are deemed to be good social risks are restored to society.
Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 319
U.S. 432, 435 (1943).
2. A parolee is a convict who, after serving a portion of his judicially imposed sen-
tence in a penal institution, is released under the supervision of a parole officer for the
remainder of the sentence. Parole is an administrative act within the exclusive discre-
tion of correctional authorities. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1972);
TASK Foc C REPORT, supra note 1, at 60-71; Wolin, After Release-The Parolee in Soci-
ety, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 1 (1973).
There does not appear to be any significant difference between the constitutional
status of probationers and parolees. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d
259, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1975) (Ninth Circuit concluding that the reasons justifying war-
rantless searches by parole officers of their parolees are equally applicable in probation
setting). This similarity was suggested in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973),
where the Supreme Court, in applying the due process clause to probation revocation
proceedings, stated that "revocation of probation . . . is constitutionally indistinguish-
able from the revocation of parole." Id. at 782 n.3. In light of this similarity, the term
"released offender" will be used throughout the remainder of this Note to refer to both
probationers and parolees.
3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
This right has been characterized as "basic to a free society," Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27 (1949), and is applicable to the states under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
4. See Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971); D. DRESSLR, PRAC-
vicE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 159 (2d ed. 1969).
5. The exclusionary rule renders inadmissible evidence seized in violation of a de-
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parole revocation proceedings,0 this conflict has been avoided in most
cases." Where a released offender is actually prosecuted for a crime
committed while he is still on probation or parole, however, he may
have a fourth amendment claim. Courts have generally agreed that
he is entitled to some degree of protection against unreasonable
searches, 8 but an appropriate standard of reasonableness has not yet
emerged. The task of formulating a standard is particularly difficult
with respect to searches conducted by correctional officers. Unlike
police, these officers have a special interest in rehabilitating their clients
which is coextensive with their duty to protect society from .further
criminal conduct. Yet while some dilution of normal fourth amend-
ment standards may be necessary in order to accommodate the infor-
mational needs of correctional officers, the risk of abuse increases as
their activities become prosecutorial in nature.
This Note will develop guidelines for formulating a standard to
govern searches by correctional officers. A review of the constitutional
status of released offenders will be followed by an examination of the
role of correctional officers, including the relationship between them
and their clients. Notable judicial attempts to deal with the fourth
amendment problem in this area will then be canvassed. Finally, after
an assessment of the value of the search as a supervisory technique,
this Note will recommend various means by which legitimate correc-
tional objectives can be achieved with a minimal degree of intrusion
into the privacy of released offenders.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
The Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey v. Brewer9 to extend
procedural protections to parolees facing revocation represented a new
fendant's fourth amendment rights. See Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975) (probation);
United States ex reL Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970) (parole).
See also United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 1975) (support-
ing cases compiled in opinion).
7. It has been estimated that parole revocation, rather than conviction for a new
offense, is the device used for two-thirds of the parolees who are reincarcerated. TAsK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.
8. See, e.g., Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
200 (1975); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970);
DiMarco v. Greene, 385 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d
289 (3d Cir. 1966); Brown v. Keamey, 355 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1966); Martin v. United
States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 904 (1950).
9. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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judicial conception of the constitutional status of released offenders.1"
Previously, courts had struggled with various theories of parole and
probation which served, in essence, to justify the complete denial of an
offender's rights." The prevalent rationale was the "custody" theory,
under which the offender was said to be entitled to no more liberty
than he would have enjoyed had he been incarcerated' 2  Morrissey
seemed to reject this theory by emphasizing that the parolee's status
more closely resembles that of an ordinary citizen than a prisoner. 13
Since parole revocation changes only the type of penalty imposed on a
convicted criminal, the Court did not afford parolees "the full panoply
of rights" -available under the fourteenth amendment to a free man
who is a defendant in a criminal prosecution.' 4  However, the Court
10. See generally Tobriner & Cohen, How Much Process Is "Due"? Parolees and
Prisoners, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (1974); Wolin, supra note 2, at 34-37; The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 95-104 (1972).
11. The theories of parole and probation are discussed in Comment, Parole: A
Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 702, 704-20
(1963); Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. Rnv. 282, 286-89 (1971); Note,
ludicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 CoLuM. L. Ray. 181, 188-93 (1967). See
also United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 273-75 (9th Cir. 1975) (Wright,
J., dissenting).
Other than the "custody" theory, see note 12 infra and accompanying text, two
other rationales have frequently been invoked to justify release conditions. The "act of
grace" theory considered probationer or parolee status a privilege which could be granted
under whatever terms the state dictated. See, e.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492
(1935); United States v. Fultz, 482 F.2d 1, 4 (8th Cir. 1973). Under the "consent"
or "waiver" theory, the offender was said to have agreed to the conditions of his release
by the very act of accepting it. See, e.g., People v. Kern, 264 Cal. App. 2d 962, 71
Cal. Rptr. 105 (1968); State v. White, 264 N.C. 600, 142 S.E.2d 153 (1965). As a
practical matter, of course, neither the probationer nor the parolee enjoys any real bar-
gaining power. See Comment, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Condi-
tions, supra, at 704-11. In addition, neither the "act of grace" theory nor the "consent"
theory can be used to justify a condition which infringes upon a fundamental right since
a state may not condition the granting of a benefit upon the relinquishment of a consti-
tutional guarantee. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
12. See, e.g., Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 95 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
946 (1968); People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 148-50, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100,
103-04 (1964). See generally White, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Parolees and
Probationers, 31 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 167, 177-81 (1969); Comment, Parole: A Critique
of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, supra note 11, at 711-20; Comment, The
Parole System, supra note 11, at 287-88.
13. The parolee has been released from prison based on an evaluation that he
shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and function as
a responsible, self-reliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he
can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to
form the other enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State prop-
erly subjects him to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his con-
dition is very different from that of confinement in a prison. 408 U.S. at 482.
14. Id. at 480.
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did term parole a form of "conditional liberty,"' 5 and considered its
curtailment a sufficiently "grievous loss' 1 to entitle a parolee to cer-
tain procedural safeguards before he can be taken back into custody, 17
and before his parole can actually be revoked.' The protections
afforded parolees in Morrissey were subsequently extended to pro-
bationers facing revocation in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.19
If Morrissey recognized that a released offender has a constitut-
tionally protected interest in his status, it left unanswered the question
of what limitations the Constitution places upon the terms of his re-
lease. Traditionally, the fixing of release conditions has been left to
the discretion of correctional authorities -and trial courts.20  This dis-
cretion has come under increasingly strict review,21 however, especially
where release conditions impinge upon the first and fourth amend-
15. Id.
16. Id. at 482.
17. A preliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause exists for the revo-
cation of parole should be conducted by some person other than the officer directly in-
volved in the case. The parolee is entitled to notice of the hearing, its purpose, and
the alleged parole violations. He can present evidence in his own behalf and question
persons who have supplied adverse information, unless such a confrontation would en-
danger the informant. Upon a showing of probable cause, the parolee is returned to
a correctional institution pending final revocation. Id. at 485-87.
18. The minimum procedural requirements of a final revocation hearing include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hear-
ing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be
judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as
to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Id. at 489.
Morrissey did not decide whether the right to counsel attached to this proceeding. Id.
19. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
20. See Comment, The Parole System, supra note 11, at 285.
21. Traditionally, challenges to the terms of release have been made on the basis
of reasonableness, rather than on constitutional grounds. For example, in Springer v.
United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945), the court avoided the eighth amend-
ment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment by deciding that probation is
not punishment. The court then struck down a probation condition requiring a draft
evader to donate a pint of blood to the Red Cross on the grounds -that this requirement
bore no reasonable relation to the crime committed. Restrictions on the range of em-
ployment opportunities available to a probationer have been held to be reasonable reha-
bilitative conditions where the convict's crime was facilitated by his former position.
See, e.g., Whaley v. United States, 324 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
911 (1964); Berra v. United States, 221 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1955), ajf'd in part, 351
U.S. 131 (1956). For an analysis of the constitutionality of normal parole conditions,
see Comment, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, supra note
11. See also Arluke, A Summary of Parole Rules-Thirteen Years Later, 15 CRIME &
DELINQUENcY 267 (1969).
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ment rights2s of a released offender. In Porth v. Templar,2" the Tenth
Circuit declared that release conditions must bear "a reasonable re-
lationship to the treatment of the [offender] and the protection of the
public,"2 4 and then struck down a condition restricting a probationer's
freedom to publicly criticize the law which he had violated. 25  The
court found that the condition did not necessarily promote rehabilita-
tion,26 and that it prohibited activity which was not per se harmful to
the public order." The case stands for the proposition that, absent a
showing of a reasonable relationship between a release condition and
the purposes of release, the abridgement of a fundamental right will
not be tolerated.28
22. Despite the notion that first amendment freedoms are "preferred," see Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-94 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); McKay, The Prefer-
ence for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 1182, 1184, 1191-93 (1959), conditions infringing
fourth amendment rights should not be subject to a reduced level of scrutiny, since these
rights are also considered fundamental. See note 3 supra. The Ninth Circuit recently
observed that
the crucial determination in testing probationary conditions is not the degree
of "preference" which may be accorded those rights limited by the condition,
but rather whether the limitations are primarily designed to affect the rehabili-
tation of the probationer or insure the protection of the public. United States
v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 n.14 (1975).
23. 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971).
24. Id. at 333. Both the American Bar Association, ABA PRoJrT ON STANDARDS
FOR CIMrINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 3.2(b) (1970), and the
American Law Institute, ALI MODEL PEnAL CODE § 301.1(2)(1) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962), have embraced a similar standard. Probation and parole conditions must
be "reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive
of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience." Id.
25. The condition under review prohibited the defendant, who had been convicted
of failure to file income tax returns, from publicly questioning the constitutionality of
the federal income tax laws or the Federal Reserve System. 453 F.2d at 331.
26. Indeed, it has been suggested that rehabilitation is enhanced by encouraging pro-
bationers to exercise their rights of expression. Note, Limitations Upon Trial Court
Discretion in Imposing Conditions of Probation, 8 GA. L. REv. 466, 480 (1974).
27. In determining that the condition would have been valid had it prohibited only
speeches "designed to urge or encourage others to violate the laws," 453 F.2d at 334,
the Tenth Circuit was apparently following the Supreme Court's directive that only
speech which is "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive
evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest" can be censored.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); see Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
28. Porth was preceded by two district court cases in which correctional authorities
were unable to show a relationship between prior restraints imposed upon a parolee's
speech and the purposes of parole. In Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749 (N.D.
Cal. 1970), which the Porth court approved, a parole officer prohibited his parolee from
addressing a student rally protesting prison conditions. The court held that the use of
a parole condition to impose subject matter restrictions on a parolee's public speech had
no reasonable relationship to rehabilitation. In Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), which the Porth court, without explanation, declined to endorse, 453
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Courts have most readily conceded the existence of a sufficient
relationship where a condition of release restricts an offender's free-
dom of association.29  Indeed, the rehabilitative and social value of
limiting a released offender's contacts with known criminals is self-evi-
dent. In Arciniega v. Freeman,30 however, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that even associational restrictions are valid only to the extent
that they promote rehabilitation. While upholding in principle a pro-
hibition against associating with other convicts, the Court held that
on-the-job contacts with fellow employees who had criminal records
could not violate a valid condition of release since the parolee's con-
tinued employment was essential to his readjustment to society.31
Thus the implication here, as in Porth, was that release conditions which
abridge fundamental first amendment freedoms can be sustained only
if they serve a legitimate and demonstrated correctional objective.
CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
The Role of the Correctional Officer
In order to determine whether a release condition diluting fourth
amendment protections serves a legitimate correctional purpose, it is
necessary to examine the responsibilities of the correctional officer,
including his relationship with his client and with law enforcement
officials. The correctional officer has been described as a "social
F.2d at 333 n.4, a parolee, who had been convicted along with Julius and Ethel Rosen-
berg of transmitting national defense information to the Soviet Union, was refused per-
mission by his parole officer to attend an anti-Vietnam war rally and a Communist
Party gathering, even though he had previously been permitted to travel greater distances
to speak on other matters. The court held that the parolee's first amendment freedoms
could be denied only "upon a showing that such prevention ... is necessary to safe-
guard against specific, concretely described and highly likely dangers of misconduct by
[the parolee] himself." 327 F. Supp. at 1306. Restrictions on a parolee's travel have
also been upheld on the basis of their supposed rehabilitative value. See Berrigan v.
Sigler, 499 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (where parole authorities were able to demon-
strate that permitting the parolee to travel to North Vietnam would place him beyond
the practical range of supervision).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Malone, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1124 (1975) (upholding a condition requiring the probationer, convicted of
unlawfully exporting arms to the Irish Republican Army, to refrain from all contact with
other Irish sympathizers); United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1973)
(upholding a prohibition against associating with known homosexuals); Birzon v. King,
469 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1972) (upholding a condition forbidding contact with other per-
sons with a criminal record). Every state, except Virginia and Wisconsin, statutorily
authorizes the restriction of a parolee's association with "undesirables." Arluke, supra
note 21, at 272-73.
30. 404 U.S. 4 (1971).
31. Id. at 4-5.
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therapist in an authoritative setting." 2  While adequately describing
the ideal, this description also indicates the primary source of diffi-
culty in determining the extent to which an officer may impinge upon
his client's constitutional rights. The authority granted to a cor-
rectional officer is intended to be a useful tool in the performance
of what is essentially social work.33 Routine inspections and home
visits are designed to enable the officer to gather the information he
needs about his client's habits and living environment so that he can
develop a viable program of rehabilitation. In addition, such visits
give the officer an opportunity to win his client's trust-to show the
client that he is not just another "cop."34 Yet an officer has a responsi-
bility to the public as well, and in the public's interest he should also
use his authority to prevent his client from engaging in further criminal
activity. 5 This responsibility to be both a helper and an enforcer creates,
in many instances, an irreconcilable conflict for the correctional offi-
cer. After having established a constructive atmosphere of mutual
trust, the officer is often reluctant to destroy a rehabilitative relation-
ship by exercising his enforcement powers.3"
The predominant theoretical view appears to be that, when a con-
flict arises because of a correctional officer's dual functions, he should
eschew the role of an enforcement officer in the interests of the re-
32. Newman, Concepts of Treatment in Probation and Parole Supervision, 25 FED.
PROBATION 11, 16 (Mar. 1961). In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), Chief
Justice Burger explained the parole officer's role as follows:
The parole officers are part of the administrative system designed to assist
parolees and to offer them guidance. The conditions of parole serve a dual
purpose; they prohibit, either absolutely or conditionally, behavior that is
deemed dangerous to the restoration of the individual into normal society.
And through the requirement of reporting to the parole officer and seeking
guidance and permission before doing many things, the officer is provided with
information about the parolee and an opportunity to advise him. The combi-
nation puts the parole officer into the position in which he can try to guide
the parolee into constructive development. Id. at 478.
33. D. DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 170-72; Weiss, The Social Worker's Technique
and Probation, in PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JusTIcE 165 (S. Glueck ed. 1933); Note,
Observations on the Administration of Parole, 79 YALE LJ. 698, 707 (1970).
34. R. DAwsON, SENTENCING 131-32 & n.101 (1969).
35. The three major objectives of correctional supervision are:
(1) control-to make the released offender conform his behavior to the re-
quirements of the law and the conditions of release during the period of
his supervision.
(2) treatment-to achieve through counselling or referral to other resources
a permanent change in the offender's antisocial behavior.
(3) service-assisting the offender and his family with such problems as ob-
taining and keeping employment. Id. at 122-23.
36. See Note, Observations on the Administration of Parole, supra note 33, at 708.
See generally Newman, supra note 32, at 12-13.
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habilitative relationship.17  Where a released offender's behavior arouses
suspicion of criminal activity, the correctional officer should defer to
police expertise.38 Such a resolution, however, has not always been
feasible. Heavy caseloads and inadequate training often result in an
inability on the part of the officer to establish the personal contacts
necessary to the development of a constructive rehabilitative relation-
ship.3" Too often his client therefore receives attention only after a
problem has arisen,40 and primary emphasis is placed upon the officer's
enforcement function.41 When such a failure in the rehabilitative effort
occurs, intrusions into the offender's privacy by a correctional officer
seem to become prosecutorial in nature. The broad authority of the
officer, which had been justified by his rehabilitative intent, can be-
come simply a means of circumventing normal constitutional pro-
cedures in a criminal investigation. This danger is particularly serious
where police look to the correctional officer for investigational support,
since the revocation of parole or probation provides a more efficient
means for removing a suspect from the streets than the institution of
a new criminal prosecution. 42  Thus, as the correctional officer moves
from the performance of rehabilitative functions to the performance of
such enforcement functions, the exercise of his authority to intrude
upon the privacy of his client becomes less justified. The courts, how-
ever, have so far failed to recognize this distinction in the fourth amend-
ment area.
Judicial Applications of the Fourth Amendment
in a Correctional Setting
The development of a standard of reasonableness for correctional
37. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 69; see United States v. Consuelo-
Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 270 (9th Cir. 1975) (Wright, J., dissenting).
38. As one correction officer has commented:
[Slurveillance, as opposed to treatment supervision, is essentially a police
responsibility. It involves techniques for which the therapy-oriented and
trained practitioner in corrections is unprepared to handle with maximum effec-
tiveness. This does not obviate the need for surveillance, but rather, places its
implementation in the hands of the police, whose responsibility it is in the
first place. Newman, supra note 32, at 14.
39. R. DAwsoN, supra note 34, at 126-28, 332-33; see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 29-30, 70, 93-102.
40. Newman, supra note 32, at 14.
41. R. DAWSON, supra note 34, at 121-23; PRESIDENTs COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SO-
CiETY 165 (1967).
42. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972); Comment, Search and
Seizure Rights of Parolees and Probationers in the Ninth Circuit, 44 FORDHAM L. REv.
617, 634-36 (1975); Note, Observations on the Administration of Parole, supra note 33,
at 706.
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searches has been no more methodical than the course of fourth amend-
ment law in general.43 Nevertheless, an effort to limit the dilution
of the released offender's rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures is discernible. 4 Released offenders have generally been afforded
full fourth amendment protection with respect to searches performed by
law enforcement officials. 45 In addition, warrantless searches conducted
by correctional officers at the behest of the police have been declared
unlawful.4 6 When reviewing searches undertaken by correctional offi-
cers on their own initiative, however, several courts have modified tra-
ditional fourth amendment protections in order to accommodate the
correctional officer's informational needs. These courts have de-
veloped a "reasonable belief' standard under which the correctional
officer is permitted to make a showing of less than probable cause in
order to justify intruding into the privacy of his client. The purpose of
43. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
Rav. 349 (1974).
44. The earliest recognition that the status of the probationer and parolee did not
justify a complete denial of fourth amendment protection occurred in Martin v. United
States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 904 (1950). Upholding a war-
rantless search by a probation officer of his client's garage, the court nevertheless ac-
knowledged that such searches must be evaluated in terms of the fourth amendment's
standard of reasonableness. The fact that the victim of the search had been convicted
of a crime and was serving his sentence, however, was deemed a circumstance relevant
to a determination of reasonableness. Id. at 439.
The notion that released offenders are protected by the fifth amendment was re-
cently recognized by the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held that statements made by
a parolee to his parole officer were inadmissible in a criminal trial where the officer
failed to warn the parolee of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
prior to questioning him. State v. Gallagher, 38 Ohio St. 2d 291, 313 N.E.2d 396
(1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
45. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 266 (9th Cir. 1975) (in-
validating search conducted by police under the Federal Probation Act); United States
ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1970) (acknowledging
illegality of warrantless search of parolee by police officer, but upholding use of seized
evidence in parole revocation hearing); DiMarco v. Greene, 385 F.2d 556 (6th Cir.
1967) (applying normal fourth amendment standards to police search incident to arrest
for parole violation); United States v. Lewis, 274 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (apply-
ing the "voluntariness" standard to an allegation that parolee consented to search by FBI
agents).
46. United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1966). After being informed
by police officers that his parolee was suspected of bank robbery, a parole officer asked
the police to cooperate in bringing the parolee to the parole office. The parole officer
then searched his client and found marked money which was used to secure a conviction.
The court invalidated the search and suppressed the evidence, holding that the parole
officer's participation did not by itself justify a lesser degree of fourth amendment pro-
tection for the parolee. Since the warrantless arrest and search were at the instance
of the police, the parole officer was considered to be acting as a mere "tool" by which
the police could not overcome the absence of probable cause necessary to secure a war-
rant. Id. at 292.
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this relaxed standard is to enable the correctional officer to perform
his dual functions, while at the same time providing a check on the
exercise of his search powers.'
In New York, a parole officer can obtain from correctional au-
thorities an administrative warrant to arrest his parolee upon a showing
that he has "reasonable cause to believe that [the parolee] has lapsed,
or is probably about to lapse, into criminal ways or company, or has
violated the conditions of his parole . ... ,48 Although this warrant
does not expressly authorize the officer to conduct a search incident to
retaking the parolee, such searches have been upheld. In United States
ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette,41 a parole officer received "reliable infor-
mation" that his parolee was associating with a convicted felon and
might be involved in narcotics traffic. This information was presented
to a regional parole director who issued a parole violation warrant,
but the warrant was executed by a police officer and a second parole
officer who was not the parolee's supervisor. They conducted a search
of the room in which the parolee was arrested and seized a quantity of
heroin which was subsequently used to convict the parolee of posses-
sion. The court upheld the search, reasoning that since the arrest was
specifically authorized by statute, the search was justified as a search
incident to a lawful arrest under the doctrine of Harris v. United States.5 0
Both the arrest and search were therefore deemed valid, even though
both were undertaken with less than probable cause.
A similar result was reached in United States ex rel. Santos v.
New York State Board of Parole." A parole violation warrant was
obtained on the basis of information received from a police detective
to the effect that the parolee was dealing in stolen goods. The parole
officer and the detective went to the parolee's apartment in order to
execute the warrant, but finding no one there, they nonetheless con-
ducted a full search. Items of stolen property were seized and later
used in evidence against the parolee. The court held that the search
was a reasonable exercise of the parole officer's investigatory authority,
since he was charged with enforcing a condition of parole which stipu-
lated that the parolee refrain from criminal activity.52
47. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251-52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
200 (1975).
48. N.Y. CoRnc. LAw § 216 (McKinney 1968).
49. 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971).
50. Id. at 1323. Harris is reported at 331 U.S. 145 (1947). The Randazzo court
noted that it would have reached a different result bad the search been conducted after
the Supreme Court's decision in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which lim-
ited the scope of searches incident to arrests. 418 F.2d at 1323.
51. 441 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972).
52. Id. at 1218-19. It is readily apparent that, under this rationale, any search by
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These two federal cases illustrate the problems involved in
evaluating searches of parolees and probationers under a relaxed fourth
amendment standard. In each case, the correctional officer was re-
quired by statute to show that he had "reasonable cause to believe"
that an investigation into his client's activities was necessary. 3  It
should be apparent, however, that the searches in these two cases were
prosecutorial in nature, undertaken in performance of the parole offi-
cer's enforcement function. Each search was conducted in coopera-
tion with law enforcement officials and led to a new conviction.54 In
neither case did the parole officer assert that the search would have
any rehabilitative value. Thus, despite statutory language which seems
to limit a parole officer's search power by requiring that the search
be related to his special supervisory duties, the searches amounted to
mere criminal investigations which would have been unlawful if con-
ducted outside of a parole setting.5-
Similar difficulties have been encountered by state courts
which have considered the role of searches in a corrections program.
While the most common approach has been to require some show-
ing on the part of the correctional officer that the search was within
the scope of his duties,5 6 the judicial response has ranged from providing
released offenders with absolute fourth amendment protection against
all searches 57 to upholding conditions which grant the correctional
officer unlimited power to search.58 The California courts have adopted
this latter approach.
a correctional officer, regardless of its prosecutorial nature, could be evaluated under the
relaxed standard. See notes 63-65 infra and accompanying text.
53. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
54. The opinion in Santos did not mention the Hallman decision. The court did
emphasize, however, that despite the fact that the search was instigated by a law enforce-
ment officer, the parole officer played a substantial role in the search. 441 F.2d at
1219. In Hallman the court objected to police using the correctional officer there as
a "tool." See note 46 supra.
55. Normal fourth amendment procedures would require the existence of probable
cause for the arrest of a criminal suspect and for the search of his personal property.
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948).
56. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, - Colo. -, 536 P.2d 302, 305 (1975) ("reason-
able grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred"); State v. Williams, 486
S.W.2d 468, 473 (Mo. 1972) (sufficient information to "arouse suspicion" that a parole
violation had occurred); Himmage v. State, 88 Nev. 296, 298, 496 P.2d 763, 765-66
(1972) ("reasonable cause"); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 88, 516 P.2d 1088,
1096 (1973) ("well founded suspicion").
57. State v. Cullison, - Iowa -, 173 N.W.2d 533, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938
(1970).
58. State v. Mitchell, 22 N.C. App. 663, 207 S.E.2d 263 (1974); State v. Schlosser,
202 N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 1972).
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In People v. Hernandez"9 a California court held that narcotics
seized by a parole officer during a warrantless search of the parolee's
automobile, conducted pursuant to a tip from an anonymous informant,
were admissible in a criminal prosecution for possession. The court
ruled that a parolee could not invoke the fourth amendment against his
officer, 60 but was careful -to point out that normal fourth amendment
standards would apply to criminal investigations conducted by police
officers.6 ' This distinction became blurred in subsequent Calif6rnia
cases, primarily "because the operative facts in situations involving co-
operation between police and parole authorities are numerous and
capable of being accorded whatever weight a given court de-
sires ... ,62 Thus, for example, in People v. Thompson 3 a war-
rantless search of a parolee's hotel room was found to be a reasonable
supervisory technique despite the fact that the search would not have
been undertaken but for information supplied by the police, and even
though the parole officer accompanying the police was not the parolee's
personal officer. A similar result was reached in People v. Limon,64
where narcotics officers conducted a preliminary investigation on the
basis of an informants tip, prior to enlisting the aid of a parole officer.
On the other hand, in People v. Coffman,6 the court invalidated a
warrantless search initiated by police officers who invited a parole
officer to accompany them, finding that the law enforcement officials
were using the parole officer solely as a means of avoiding the prob-
able cause requirement.
These cases illustrate the difficulty of protecting a released offender
from police abuses without discouraging cooperation between correc-
tional authorities and law enforcement officials. The principal source
of these problems seems to be the assumption that since violations of
the law are always violations of the conditions of release, it is within
the scope of the correctional officer's authority to investigate these vio-
lations. When correctional officers perform such essentially prosecu-
torial tasks, they function like police. Any effort to distinguish their
59. 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953
(1965),
60. Id. at 150-51, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
61. Id. at 147 n.2, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 102 n.2.
62. Comment, The Parole System, supra note 11, at 329. See also Note, Extend-
Ing Search-and-Seizure Protection to Parolees in California, 22 STAN. L. REV. 129, 129-
34 (1969); 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 153 (1973).
63. 252 Cal. App. 2d 76, 60 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930
(1968).
64. 255 Cal. App. 2d 519, 63 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 866
(1968).
65. 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
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enforcement activities from the normal duties of the police can only
lead to the inconsistencies evident in the decisions of the California
courts.
The California Supreme Court apparently resolved these incon-
sistencies against the released offender by deciding in People v. Mason6
that a condition of release requiring that the offender "submit .. to
[a] search . . .at any time . . .with or without a search warrant,
whenever requested to do so by the Probation Officer or any law en-
forcement officer" may be reasonable.07 The court did stress that such
a "submission to search" condition must be reasonably related to the
crime for which the offender was originally convicted.68 In Mason,
the condition was imposed upon a probationer convicted of possession
of marijuana, and the use of the condition in California has been sub-
stantially limited to narcotics offenders. 69  Nevertheless, despite the
obvious deterrent effect that such a broad condition has upon the of-
fender's proclivity for crime, the absence of a requirement that searches
conducted pursuant to the condition be related to the rehabilitation of
the offender renders the condition a complete denial of fourth amend-
ment protections. 70  This result seems inconsistent with the general rule
that any governmental action which abridges fundamental rights be
undertaken in accordance with narrowly drawn regulations. 7' On the
66. 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1016 (1972).
67. Id. at 762, 488 P.2d at 631, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
68. Id. at 764, 488 P.2d at 632, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 304. In People v. Kay, 36
Cal. App. 3d 759, 111 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1973), a "submission to search" condition was
struck down as not reasonably related to a conviction for felony assault and battery,
where the offender had used items not ordinarily concealed (sticks, broom handles, steel
bars, and table legs). Id. at 762, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
69. See, e.g., Marts v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 517, 122 Cal. Rptr. 687
(1975); People v. Thomas, 45 Cal. App. 3d 749, 119 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1975); People
v. Garcia, 44 Cal. App. 3d 1029, 119 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1975); People v. Byrd, 38 Cal.
App. 3d 941, 113 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1974); People v. Calais, 37 Cal. App. 3d 898, 112
Cal. Rptr. 685 (1974); Russi v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 160, 108 Cal. Rptr.
716 (1973).
70. One court has attempted to limit Mason by holding that police searches of pro-
bationers who are "subject to search" are reasonable only "Ewihen a known probationer
...is discovered conducting himself in a manner that suggests a resumption of the mis-
conduct that brought about the condition of probation ... " People v. Bremmer, 30
Cal. App. 3d 1058, 1065, 106 Cal. Rptr. 797, 802 (1973).
71. In a wide variety of contexts, the Supreme Court has stated that "even though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). This standard has
been applied primarily where first amendment freedoms are involved. See, e.g., Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-64 (1965);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940). However, the Court has also en-
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other hand, it does represent a realistic appraisal of the futile efforts
of California courts to distinguish between correctional officers exercis-
ing their enforcement powers and the police.
The Ninth Circuit's Search for a Standard
A pair of recent cases from the Ninth Circuit, Latta v. Fitzharri72
and United States v. Consuelo-Gonzale, 73 presented the question of
how to evaluate searches of released offenders undertaken by correc-
tional officers. Sitting en banc, the court was unable to agree on an
appropriate standard;74 however, the various opinions written in the
two cases represent the most thorough analysis of the problem to date.
In Latta the court held that although the fourth amendment has
some application to searches conducted in a parole setting, the realities
of the parole system require that parole officers be permitted to proceed
with less than probable cause. The officer in the case discovered his
parolee smoking marijuana at the home of an acquaintance and prompt-
ly took him into custody." Six hours later the parole officer and two
policemen conducted a full search of the parolee's home, which was
more than thirty miles from where the arrest was made. There they
found a large quantity of marijuana, and this contraband was subse-
quently used to convict the parolee of possession with intent to dis-
tribute.
In upholding the search, the plurality first observed that police
personnel neither initiated nor supervised the search in question.
76
Then, pointing to the "special and unique interest" which parole offi-
cers have in "invading the privacy" of their clients,7 7 the court declared
that parole officers need more information about their parolees than
is available through less intrusive techniques in order to promote re-
habilitation. 8 These considerations rendered both the probable cause
standard and the warrant requirement inappropriate in the court's view.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit enunciated the following standard:
forced this restriction where a person's right to privacy is impinged. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
72. 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 200 (1975).
73. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
74. Both cases were decided by five-judge pluralities. In Latta, there were two con-
currences and one dissent. There were two of each in Consuelo-Gonzalez.
75. The legality of the arrest was not at issue. 521 F.2d at 247.
76. Id. Searches initiated by police have been struck down by other courts. See
note 46 supra and text accompanying note 65 supra.
77. Id. at 249.
78. Id. at 249-50.
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[T]he parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole
officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is neces-
sary in the performance of his duties. The parole officer ought to know
more about the parolee than anyone else but his family. He is there-
fore in a better position than anyone else to decide whether a search
is necessary. His decision may be based upon specific facts, though
they be less than sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause. It
may even be based on a "hunch," arising from what he has learned or
observed about the behavior and attitude of the parolee.79
Unfortunately, the court did not reveal the basis for the parole offi-
cer's decision to conduct a search in Latta.
In Consuelo-Gonzalez the Ninth Circuit clarified the Latta stan-
dard by holding that a condition of probation requiring the probationer
to submit to searches by any law enforcement officer 0 was outside
the scope of a trial court's discretion under the Federal Probation Act.8 '
The case involved a search by FBI agents who had received informa-
tion that the probationer, previously convicted of smuggling heroin,
was again engaging in narcotics traffic. The agents checked the sus-
pect's record, learned of the "submission to search" condition of her
probation, and, on the basis of this condition, conducted a thorough
search of her home which uncovered heroin and various narcotics
paraphernalia. The Ninth Circuit, however, declared the search illegal
under the Federal Probation Act. Noting that searches may constitute
an effective supervisory technique in cases involving probationers con-
victed of narcotics offenses,8" the plurality suggested that searches
"conducted in a reasonable manner and at a reasonable time by a pro-
bation officer" would be permissible under the Act. 3  Where such
searches are conducted by law enforcement officers, however, the court
feared that probation could become a "subterfuge for criminal investi-
gations," and concluded that normal fourth amendment standards must
be enforced.84 The court emphasized that a more relaxed standard
would have been applicable had the search in Consuelo-Gonzalez been
conducted under the "immediate and personal supervision' of a proba-
tion officer. 85
79. Id. at 250.
80. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970).
82. 521 F.2d at 265.
83. Id. at 263.
84. Id. at 267, quoting Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 96 S. Ct. 200 (1975).
85. 521 F.2d at 266. A federal district court in South Dakota recently found the
Latta standards applicable to searches by probation officers as well as parole officers.
Connelly v. Parkinson, 18 Caim. L. REP. 2331 (D.S.D. Dec. 17, 1975).
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Most courts have permitted correctional officers to undertake a
search of their clients upon a showing of something less than probable
cause.80 Latta and Consuelo-Gonzalez are the first federal cases to
develop a specific standard, however, and the result reached by the
Ninth Circuit therefore deserves a close examination. A federal dis-
trict court in New York recently sought to apply the Latta standard
in United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith.87 In that case a parole
officer made a routine visit to his client's room, but the parolee was
not at home. Despite his "utter lack of any articulated or unarticu-
lated suspicions,"8 8 the officer searched the room and found heroin
hidden in a suitcase under the bed which was subsequently used to
convict the parolee of possession. Overturning the conviction, the court
ruled that the "on the spot" search was unlawful since the officer was
unable to point to anything "in the way of subjective information to
justify the search ....",19
Prior to his visit, the parole officer in Coleman did not suspect any
parole violations, nor did he observe anything while in the room which
could reasonably have aroused his suspicion. 90 The court therefore
determined that, even under the test devised in Latta, the search in
question was unreasonable. 91 It would seem, however, that under the
terms of Latta the decision could easily have gone the other way. The
Ninth Circuit did not require reasons from the parole officer in Latta
in order to uphold the search, only a "hunch," 2 and the fact that the
court in Coleman did require a stronger showing9 3 may actually belie
misgivings about the degree of protection available under a strict read-
ing of Latta.4  Indeed, it is difficult to envision many situations in
which a correctional officer, having conducted a search and having
found incriminating evidence, would be unable to convince a reviewing
court that he had a "hunch" that the evidence would be found.
86. See notes 47 & 56 supra and accompanying text.
87. 395 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
88. Id. at 1158.
89. Id. at 1159.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 521 F.2d at 250.
93. 395 F. Supp. at 1159.
94. The trial judge noted that he "harborted] reservations" about the plurality opin-
ions in Latta and Consuelo-Gonzalez. Id. Judge Choy, who participated in the Ninth
Circuit decisions, also foresaw problems with requiring only a "hunch." Latta v. Fitz-
harris, 521 F.2d 246, 253-54 (9th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
200 (1975); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 267 (9th Cir. 1975)
(concurring opinion).
[Vol. 1976:71
PAROLE SUPERVISION
Beyond the question of how much protection the requirement of
a mere "hunch" affords, this low threshold established by the Latta
court for satisfying the "reasonable belief' standard also distorts the
meaning of a phrase which has been given constitutional significance
by the Supreme Court in a line of cases dealing with on-the-street en-
counters between law enforcement officers and ordinary citizens, There
are significant parallels between the role of a correctional officer and
that of a "cop on the beat." Each officer represents a supervisory pres-
ence, primarily concerned with gathering information in order to deter
criminal activity.9 5  Thus, it is essential that each officer develop a
special rapport with the "community" he serves. He is more likely to
accomplish his objectives if he is able to elicit the cooperation of the
people under his supervision.
The leading case in the street encounter area is Terry v. Ohio,96
where the Supreme Court upheld the admission of evidence seized dur-
ing a "stop and frisk," a brief custodial detention accompanied by a
"pat-down" search for weapons.9" The Court decided that such a
limited search would be reasonable under the fourth amendment when-
ever "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the . . .
search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the ac-
tion taken [is] appropriate ". ,,98 The Court reasoned that "[a]ny-
thing less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result
this Court has consistently refused to sanction."9 9 Lower courts were
therefore instructed to give "due weight . . . not to [the officer's]
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience."' 100 The Terry test thus resembles the tort stan-
95. Compare L. SCHWARTZ & S. GOLDSTEIN, POLICE GUIDANCE MANUALS No. 4, at
1-7 (1968) and THE NATIONAL CENTER ON POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, A NA-
TIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS 327-36 (1967) with notes 33-
35 supra and accompanying text.
96. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
97. Id. at 30. A police officer observed three men who appeared to be "casing"
a store for a robbery. He approached them for questioning, frisked them, and found
weapons on the persons of two. Id. at 6-7.
98. Id. at 21-22.
99. Id. at 22 (emphasis added). The Court cited as examples Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); and Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959).
100. 392 U.S. at 27. The Court further developed the concept of "reasonable belief"
in the companion case of Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). The Court stated
there that in order to justify a warrantless on-the-street search a police officer must be
able to "point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual
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dard for assessing the conduct of a person with superior knowledge or
skill. An expert's behavior must not only be reasonable, it must also
be consistent with his expertise. 10 1
Adopting the Terry Court's sense of "reasonable belief' in the
area of correctional searches would provide a more effective means of
controlling parole and probation officers than the mere "hunch" re-
quirement of Latta. As a practical matter, requiring just a "hunch"--
a mere subjective suspicion-forces a reviewing judge to defer to
correctional authorities in every case. The more objective Terry re-
quirements, while acknowledging an officer's expertise, permit the
judge to assess the search in light of his own notions of reasonableness.
It is suggested that the net result is a workable system of meaningful
review which nevertheless leaves a significant amount of discretion
with the correctional officer.10
2
The Use of Searches as a Correctional Technique
The foregoing development of a fourth amendment standard for
reviewing searches by parole and probation officers has postponed con-
sideration of one fundamental question: what is it about the relation-
ship between a correctional officer and his client that justifies the cur-
tailment of a constitutional right? It appears well-settled that released
offenders are entitled to full fourth amendment protection with respect
to searches by both law enforcement officials' 0 3 and correctional au-
thorities acting at the behest of law enforcement officials.' It would
was armed and dangerous." Id. at 64. See generally La Fave, "Street Encounters" and
the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MiCH. L. REv. 40 (1968).
The American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure adopted
the Terry standard for street encounters and provided a further explanation of the type
of showing required to support a "reasonable suspicion." The Model Code provides that
a law enforcement officer may stop a person where he "reasonably suspects that
[the person] has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit a misdemeanor
or felony, involving danger of forcible injury . . . ." MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGN-
MENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(1) (a) (i) (Proposed Official Draft, Apr. 15, 1975). The po-
lice officer can frisk a person he has stopped where he "reasonably believes that his
safety or the safety of others then present so requires . . . ." Id. § 110.2(4). The
drafters emphasized that there is no substantive difference between the standard of "rea-
sonable suspicion" in section 110.2(1) (a) (i) and the standard in Terry. A police offi-
cer who conducts a "stop and frisk" "must be prepared to justify his action in terms
of objective facts in the light of which his action must appear reasonable. Thus, intui-
tion, hunch, or mere subjective suspicion will not suffice." Id. Commentary to § 110.2,
at 282-83.
101. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THEs LAW OF TORTs § 32, at 161 (4th ed. 1971).
102. This approach was taken by a Washington appellate court in State v. Simms,
10 Wash. App. 75, 87-88, 516 P.2d 1083, 1095-96 (1973).
103. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notei 46 & 65 supra and accompanying text.
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therefore appear that, when the purpose of a search is to gather evi-
dence of suspected criminal activity, the released offender is entitled
to the same constitutional safeguards that protect ordinary citizens.
Only where the correctional officer is performing functions unique to
his office would a lesser degree of concern for the privacy of his client
seem justified.
The difficulty with this analysis is that the. correctional officer
has historically performed two separate functions, rehabilitation and
enforcement." 5 Furthermore, when investigating for a suspected vio-
lation of release conditions pursuant to his enforcement function, the
officer's actions are often indistinguishable from those of any law en-
forcement official. The California courts encountered just this problem
in the line of cases beginning with Hernandez, where they sought un-
successfully to extend extraordinary search powers to correctional
officers without regard to when those powers should be used. 10 What-
ever the validity of the assumption underlying this result-namely, that
criminal activity is always a violation of release conditions and there-
fore a legitimate matter of concern for the officer' 0 --it should be clear
that enforcement is a function which correctional officers share with
law enforcement officials. What makes the job of the correctional
officer unique is his responsibility for the rehabilitation of his client,
and it would therefore seem that he should enjoy extraordinary search
powers only when he is performing this function.
If it is possible to determine when a correctional officer is perform-
ing rehabilitative functions and when he is acting like a law enforcement
official, what rehabilitative purposes are served by correctional searches?
Can these objectives be achieved by less intrusive means? The most
frequently mentioned purposes of correctional searches are supervision,
deterrence, and public acceptance. Periodic home inspections can pro-
vide the officer with a feel for his client's environment and an oppor-
tunity to observe his rehabilitative progress first-hand.10 8  It is also
apparent that released offenders will be less likely to commit unlawful
acts within their homes if they realize that their supervisor may make
an unannounced visit at any time.' 0 9 Finally, as the Hernandez court
105. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
107. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
108. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 249-50 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
200 (1975); R. DAWSON, supra note 34, at 129-32; Newman, supra note 32, at 16.
109. See, e.g., People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 763, 488 P.2d 630, 632, 97 Cal. Rptr.
302, 304 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972); People v. Kern, 264 Cal. App.
962, 965, 71 Cal. Rptr. 105, 107 (1968).
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observed, "intense scrutiny by correctional authorities is a vital in-
gredient of a publicly acceptable parole system."110  Too high a rate
of recidivism among released offenders will result either in legislation
limiting the availability of parole and probation as alternatives to im-
prisonment, or in a judicial reluctance to grant these more lenient forms
of punishment.11
Although correctional searches may often serve the functions listed
above, doubt remains as to their rehabilitative utility. For example,
Judge Wright, dissenting in Consuelo-Gonzalez, feared that searches
aimed at deterring criminal activity might destroy the atmosphere of
trust and confidence built up between a supervisor and his client, and
that they are therefore more appropriately conducted by police offi-
cers."12 One commentator has also argued that frequent searches ad-
versely affect a released offender's ability to renew ties with his family
and friends."' Not only may searches actually deter rehabilitation, how-
ever; a real danger also exists that searches ostensibly undertaken for
rehabilitative purposes may in fact be prosecutorial in nature. A
"routine" home inspection, whether designed to gather information, to
catch the offender off-guard, or to placate public fears, comes peri-
lously close to an ordinary criminal investigation when undertaken by
virtue of a suspicion that the offender is engaged in unlawful activity.
Yet searches justified under either the second or third objective listed
above clearly, perhaps necessarily, run this risk. To prevent such an
abuse, to avoid converting the correctional program into a "subterfuge
for criminal investigations, 1"4 limitations on the correctional officer's
power to search are needed.
Significant protection can be afforded released offenders simply
by focusing post-search judicial review on the correctional officer's
motive in undertaking the search. When a correctional officer, per-
haps as the result of a tip from police officers or an informant, enters
his client's home in order to investigate suspected criminal activity,
his motive is essentially prosecutorial, and he is entitled to no greater
authority than a law enforcement official. When the home visit is made
110. 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149-50, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1964).
111. Cf. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 266 (9th Cir. 1975); id.
at 271-72 (Wright, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 270-71 (dissenting opinion). Cf. People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 769-
70, 488 P.2d 630, 636, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 308 (1971) (Peters, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
113. See Note, Extending Search-and-Seizure Protection to Parolees in California,
supra note 62, at 135.
114. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 200
(1975).
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in the course of supervising rehabilitation, however, he should be
afforded some latitude. The question is whether the officer comes
solely with the expectation of uncovering criminal activity.'- 5 While
motivation can be difficult to prove, several courts have successfully
used this factor as a basis for limiting the investigatory activities of
administrative agencies to their authorized objectives.1
A second safeguard suggested by developments in the area of
administrative searches 1 7 is the formulation of detailed regulations
specifying the situations in which a correctional officer may be given
broad powers to search, and limiting the scope of such intrusions." 8
Correctional efficiency is promoted by adapting the intensity of super-
vision to the crime involved and the behavioral history of the released
115. In distinguishing between health inspections and criminal searches, one com-
mentator has observed:
mhe police officer who undertakes a search has reasonable grounds to expect
to find evidence of wrongdoing, and would be disappointed if the search were
fruitless; the health inspector who conducts an inspection, on the other hand,
has no reason to anticipate that he will find particular violations; he looks for
compliance with the health laws and regulations, and the absence of instances
of noncompliance ought to be a source of satisfaction, rather than of disap-
pointment, to him. F. GRAD, PumnIc HEALTH LAw MANuAL 76 (1965).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Kessler, 364 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Ohio 1973); United
States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953).
117. Warrants are not always required in the administrative field. In United States
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless inspection of
a gun shop which resulted in the seizure of illegal weapons pursuant to the Gun Control
Act of 1968. Among. the factors justifying such inspections, the Court emphasized two
which have special relevance to correctional searches: (1) the inspections were author-
ized as a crucial part of a pervasive regulatory scheme, id. at 315, and (2) firearms deal-
ers were annually furnished with a copy of the regulations to which they were subject,
and thus were "not left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of
his task." Id. at 316. Biswell was preceded by Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), which declared unlawful a warrantless inspection of a retail
liquor dealer's premises which was accomplished by forcible entry. The Court acknowl-
edged the power of Congress to authorize warrantless inspections in "closely regulated
industries," but held that, absent an express regulation, forcible entry was unreasonable
under the fourth amendment. Id. at 76-77.
118. Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit suggested such an approach in United
States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
Parole is far more apt to be successful when limitations on the parolee's free-
dom are delineated with some degree of certainty ....
* * * I would prefer to have the Parole Board ...spell out in precise
terms-before release-its determination that searches . . . were reasonable in
terms of both the overall goals of parole and the dangers of harassment or
worse." Id. at 1168 (concurring opinion).
See also United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1160 (W.D.N.Y.
1975). The Latta plurality itself drew an analogy to parole searches from the Supreme
Court's administrative search exception to the warrant requirement. 521 F.2d at 250-
51; see Comment, Search and Seizure Rights of Parolees and Probationers in the Ninth
Circuit, supra note 42, at 626-30.
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offender.119 Regulations might therefore specify the crimes for which
a "submission to search" condition could be imposed, and enumerate
those character traits which indicate whether a particular offender will
require careful surveillance. For example, persons who have been
convicted of crimes which do not involve contraband substances, stolen
property, or dangerous weapons should seldom, if ever, be subject to
searches as a condition of probation or parole. 120 Search conditions
might also be limited to such cases as narcotics offenses, where close
supervision has proven to be an especially effective means of monitor-
ing rehabilitative progress.12
Regulating the permissible scope of correctional searches is more
difficult. Under the fourth amendment the scope of a criminal search
is controlled by the requirement that a warrant describe in particular
the place to be searched and the things to be seized; 2 2 but a correctional
officer performing a purely rehabilitative search has no idea of where
to look or what he will find until he arrives on the scene. Clearly,
there would be a substantial risk of abuse if the officer were
permitted to rummage throughout an entire home. On the other hand,
no reasonable parameters suggest themselves. For this reason, legis-
latures might consider removing all search powers from correctional
officers. Whatever the rehabilitative value of a search, its legitimate
objectives might be equally attainable through the use of less intrusive
means, such as the "home visit."
The "Home Visit" As An Investigatory Alternative
The "home visit differs from a full search in that the correctional
119. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 29; Comment, The Parole System,
supra note 11, at 309. But see Arluke, supra note 21, where the author notes that in
New York, Colorado, and North Carolina all grants of parole are conditional upon the
parolee's submission to searches conducted by his parole officer. Id. at 274.
120. A bill recently introduced into the General Assembly of North Carolina restricts
the use of "submission to search" conditions to those cases in which such searches are
"reasonably related to [the offender's] . . . supervision." S.B. 663, art. 82, § 15A-1343
(b)(15); id. art. 85, § 15A-1374(b)(11) (Apr. 25, 1975). The drafters of the bill
noted that such a condition should only be imposed where the offender has been con-
victed of a crime involving contraband, stolen property, or weapons. Id. Draft Com-
mentary.
121. See Diskind & Klonsky, A Second Look at the New York State Parole Drug
Experiment, 28 FED. PROBATION 34 (Dec. 1964); Root, What the Probation Officer Can
Do for Special Types of Offenders, 13 FED. PROBATION 19-20 (Dec. 1949); Vaillant &
Rasor, The Role of Compulsory Supervision in the Treatment of Addiction, 30 FED.
PROBATION 53 (June 1966). Judge Wright, dissenting in Consuelo-Gonzalez, pointed
out that both federal district and state judges in California have been imposing "submis-
sion to search" conditions for several years in drug-related cases. 521 F.2d at 270 (dis-
senting opinion).
122. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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officer simply converses with the client at his home and limits his obser-
vations to the immediate surroundings.'- 3 Despite its limited scope,
the visit can be an effective rehabilitative tool for achieving the stated
objectives of an ordinary search.' 24 The correctional officer can de-
velop a "feel" for his clients home environment; if unannounced, home
visits can have a deterrent effect upon criminal behavior; and regular
visits provide the continuous supervision necessary to minimize reci-
divism and thus win the public's confidence in release programs.
In Wyman v. James,'25 the Supreme Court considered the consti-
tutional significance of home visits in the context of welfare supervision.
The Court held that such visits were outside the purview of the fourth
amendment when employed to ensure compliance with lawful regula-
tions. 12 6 The Court suggested in dicta, however, that even if home
visits were evaluated as "searches" under the fourth amendment, they
should be upheld as reasonable for essentially three reasons: (I) pub-
lic interest in a properly administered welfare program; 27 (2) the
value of home visits as a means of gathering essential information un-
attainable through alternative techniques; 128 and (3) the fact that home
visits are made by trained caseworkers "whose primary objective is, or
should be, the welfare, not the prosecution, of the aid recipient for
whom the worker has profound responsibility."' 29
The home visit could be sustained as a reasonable supervisory
device in the corrections field by drawing on the analysis suggested in
Wyman. Certainly, the public has a legitimate interest in seeing that
correctional systems function properly, 30 and it is equally clear that
familiarity with a client's home environment is of significant value to
a correctional officer.' 3 ' Thus, where an officer makes a visit for
purely rehabilitative purposes, the analogy to Wyman would be com-
plete.
The analogy requires that correctional officers relinquish their
law enforcement powers. The Wyman Court emphasized that welfare
workers have no criminal investigatory responsibilities, 32 and that
123. See R. DAWSON, supra note 34, at 129-32, 326-30; White, supra note 12, at
187-89. See generally Comment, The Parole System, supra note 11, at 337.
124. See notes 108-11 supra and accompanying text.
125. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
126. Id. at 318.
127. Id. at 318-19.
128. Id. at 320.
129. Id. at 322-23.
130. See notes 110-11 supra and accompanying text.
131. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
132. 400 U.S. at 323.
Vol. 1976:71]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
the consequences of discovering suspicious activity should therefore be
"no greater than that which necessarily ensues upon any other discovery
by a citizen of criminal conduct."' 33 The implication for a correctional
officer who seeks to justify home visits under Wyman is that he would
have no authority to seize evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.
Rather, he would have the option of either giving his client a warning
and a second chance, seizing the evidence for use in a revocation pro-
ceeding,'134 or relating his observations to the police, which they may
then exploit for the purpose of establishing probable cause and secur-
ing a warrant. The officer would not be required to abandon his reha-
bilitative efforts in order to undertake his own criminal investigation.
This responsibility would be left with the official body to which it is
charged, the police.
'CONCLUSION
This Note has emphasized the distinction between correctional
supervision which seeks to restore a released offender to society
through rehabilitation, and supervision which seeks merely to investi-
gate and prosecute criminal activity. Although correctional officers
have historically performed both types of supervision, it is the reha-
bilitative function which makes their relationships with their clients
unique, and which justifies the extraordinary search powers that they
enjoy. Prosecutorial searches of released offenders should be subject
to the same fourth amendment limitations as those of ordinary citizens,
and safeguards are necessary to insure that an officer's special powers
are not abused. Perhaps the most effective means of guarding against
the temptation to circumvent offenders' rights, however, is to withdraw
search powers from correctional officers altogether, and to limit super-
vision to the "home visit" technique. Less intrusive than the full search,
and less open to abuse, the home visit should be considered as an alter-
native, rather than a mere supplement, to the correctional search.
133. Id.
134. Released offenders enjoy no fourth amendment rights with respect to revoca-
tion proceedings. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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